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Off-Site Conditions and Disclosure Duties:  
Drawing the Line at the Property Line 
Florrie Young Roberts∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  A. The Duty To Disclose Defects 
In a majority of jurisdictions, a seller of real property has an 
affirmative obligation to make certain disclosures to the buyer 
concerning the condition of the property being sold.1 This is a 
reversal of the old rule of caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware,” that 
governed sales of real property until the middle of the twentieth 
century.2 Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, as long as the seller 
did not affirmatively misrepresent the condition of the property or 
conceal a defect, he could without liability remain silent and fail to 
disclose the existence of defects to the buyer.3 
The doctrine of caveat emptor was abandoned for reasons of 
fairness and efficiency. As one court noted, modern notions of good 
faith and fair dealing are inconsistent with a seller escaping liability 
for the existence of a latent defect of which he knows and declines to 
disclose to a diligent buyer.4 Accordingly, most states now impose a 
duty on sellers to disclose certain defects to buyers. Generally, a 
defect must be disclosed if it is known to the seller, not observable to 
 
          ∗    Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California; B.A. 1971, Stanford 
University; J.D. 1974, University of Southern California. The author wishes to thank her 
research assistants, Lior Kosovski and Carrie Frederickson, for their valuable contributions to 
this Article. 
 1. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 
S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982). 
 2. Leo Bearman Jr., Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty—Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 
14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (1961). 
 3. See Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., 612 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“The 
doctrine of caveat emptor . . . provides that . . . [a]bsent an express agreement, a material 
misrepresentation or active concealment of a material fact, the seller cannot be held liable for 
any harm sustained by the buyer or others as the result of a defect existing at the time of the 
sale.”). 
 4. Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 628. 
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the prospective buyer, and materially affects the value of the 
property.5 
B. The Problem of Off-Site Conditions 
An unresolved issue regarding the scope of the seller’s obligation 
to disclose conditions affecting the property concerns the location of 
the alleged defect. The initial cases overturning caveat emptor, and 
by far the majority of cases imposing a disclosure duty, have involved 
defects located within the boundaries of the property being sold. 
Such defects are referred to as “on-site conditions” and include, for 
example, a leaky roof,6 a cracked foundation,7 cockroach infesta-
tion,8 defective sewage disposal,9 and asbestos on the property.10 
However, some disappointed buyers have sued sellers for failure 
to disclose defects when the alleged defect was external to the 
property itself. Such defects are called “off-site conditions.” 
Examples of off-site conditions include noisy neighbors,11 a nearby 
highway,12 an adjacent wastewater treatment plant,13 construction of 
an apartment complex in the area,14 a neighbor’s plans to build a 
tennis court,15 and a toxic waste contamination problem on a 
neighboring property.16 
 
 5. E.g., Shapiro v. Sutherland, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 107 (Ct. App. 1998). For a 
discussion of the general duty to disclose defects, see Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties 
in Real Estate Sales and Attempts To Reallocate the Risk, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001). 
 6. Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 626. 
 7. Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 886 (W. Va. 1982). 
 8. Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 71 (N.J. 1974). 
 9. Anderson v. Harper, 622 A.2d 319, 324–25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 10. Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 805, 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993). 
 11. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Sutherland, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 105 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 12. See, e.g., DiNunzio v. Jenkins, No. 97-0706B, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 300, at 
*2–3 (July 21, 1999). 
 13. Ribak v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 702 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997). 
 14. Blaine v. J.E. Jones Constr. Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).  
 15. Tobin v. Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d 574, 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1975). 
 16. Urman v. S. Boston Sav. Bank, 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Mass. 1997). 
ROBERTS.MRO.DOC 10/25/2006 3:11:11 PM 
957] Off-Site Conditions and Disclosure Duties 
 959 
C. Summary of Article 
Courts use various approaches when the alleged defect is an off-
site condition. Part II outlines these differing methods. Some 
jurisdictions use the same test as they would if the defect were on the 
property itself.17 Other jurisdictions have formulated specific rules 
applicable to off-site conditions.18 Similarly, jurisdictions have 
adopted different legislative approaches to off-site conditions which 
are explored in Part III. Some statutes require disclosure of certain 
off-site conditions,19 while others appear to limit the disclosure duty 
to on-site defects.20 Part IV briefly mentions the treatment of two 
problematic off-site conditions—stigma defects and the presence of a 
sex offender in the neighborhood. After exploring the various 
judicial and statutory approaches, Part V argues that non-
professional sellers21 of real estate should have no duty to disclose 
off-site conditions. Such a bright-line rule of no disclosure would 
provide predictability and promote judicial efficiency without 
compromising fairness.22 
 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See infra Part III.B. 
 21. Some of the cases and statutes discussed in this article apply to brokers, developers, 
or professional sellers. These cases are mentioned to illustrate the various approaches that 
courts and legislatures have used. The policies and the proposed rule discussed in Part V of this 
Article are meant to apply specifically to non-professional sellers of real property. This article 
does not consider whether additional duties should be placed on brokers or professional sellers. 
 22. The rule proposed by this Article applies to a seller’s failure to disclose defects and 
does not address the situation where a seller makes an affirmative misrepresentation. Just as the 
doctrine of caveat emptor did not protect a seller who made affirmative misrepresentations 
about on-site defects, Westover Court Corp. v. Eley, 40 S.E.2d 177, 179 (Va. 1946) (holding 
that a buyer is entitled to recover damages due to a seller’s misrepresentations), a bright-line 
rule of non-disclosure with regard to off-site defects should not protect a seller who 
misrepresents information to a buyer or falsely responds to a buyer’s questions. 
  For example, in O’Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., the seller was aware that two 
buyers intended to use the purchased land for chemical storage and represented to the buyers 
that the land would be suitable for such a purpose. 542 A.2d 333, 334–35 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1988). After closing, the city refused to allow the buyer to build because the well of a nearby 
town could have been polluted as a result. Id. at 335. The court concluded that a jury could 
reasonably find that the seller’s misrepresentation induced the buyers to purchase the land. Id. 
at 337. Similarly, in M/I Schottenstein Homes, Inc. v. Azam, the plaintiff claimed that the seller 
represented to him that a parcel of land located approximately five hundred feet away was a 
natural preserve. 813 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 2002). After closing, the buyer discovered that the 
county planned to build a school on that parcel. Id. The court concluded that the questions of 
whether a seller made fraudulent misrepresentations and whether a buyer was justified in 
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II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DISCLOSURE OF OFF-SITE 
CONDITIONS 
A. Off-Site Defects Treated the Same as On-Site Defects 
A number of courts have utilized an approach that makes no 
distinction between disclosure duties for on-site and off-site 
conditions. The same test is used for a seller’s duty to disclose 
defects, irrespective of the physical location of that defect. 
1. Parameters of the common law disclosure duty 
Most states that impose a common law duty on sellers to disclose 
defects look to similar factors to determine what defects must be 
disclosed. Disclosure is required for defects that are (1) known to the 
seller, (2) unknown and not readily observable by the buyer, and (3) 
material.23 A defect is material if it objectively affects the value or 
desirability of the property.24 For purposes of this Article, this test 
will be referred to as the “general disclosure duty” test or the 
“general” test. 
The cases in which this general test originated involved major 
physical defects in the property being sold. For example, in Clauser 
v. Taylor, an early California case imposing a duty on the seller to 
disclose defects, the seller failed to disclose that the property had 
been filled with debris and then covered over.25 Similarly, in Johnson 
v. Davis, the first case imposing a duty to disclose defects in Florida 
and calling the doctrine of caveat emptor “unappetizing,”26 the seller 
had failed to disclose a badly leaking roof.27 
 
relying on such misrepresentations are questions of fact to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. Id. at 94. Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of a motion to 
dismiss that was previously granted in favor of the sellers. Id. at 96. 
  Similarly, beyond the scope of this Article is a discussion of the law in those states 
that still adhere to the doctrine of caveat emptor in real estate sales. For a discussion of the law 
in these jurisdictions, see Roberts, supra note 5, at 13–14. Since these jurisdictions do not even 
require disclosure of on-site conditions, they would not require disclosure of off-site 
conditions. 
 23. E.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985). 
 24. Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (Ct. App. 1963). 
 25. 112 P.2d 661, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). 
 26. Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 628. 
 27. Id. at 626. Following a heavy rain, the plaintiff homeowners discovered water 
“‘gushing’ in from around the window frame, the ceiling of the family room, the light fixtures, 
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2. Cases where courts used the general test and required disclosure of 
off-site conditions 
Some courts have applied the traditional analysis for the duty to 
disclose on-site conditions to determine whether sellers also have a 
duty to disclose off-site conditions. In Ribak v. Centex Real Estate 
Corp., residential homebuyers brought suit against a developer/seller 
alleging that the seller had failed to disclose the existence of a 
wastewater treatment plant adjacent to the purchased property.28 
The trial court granted partial summary judgment stating that 
Florida law did not impose on a seller an obligation to disclose off-
site conditions.29 The appellate court disagreed and reiterated the 
general disclosure duty test that disclosure is required where the 
seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the 
property that are not readily observable and not known to the 
buyer.30 Thus, the Ribak court espoused the same test for the 
disclosure of off-site conditions as it uses for on-site conditions. It 
made no distinction based on the location of the condition and held 
the seller liable for nondisclosure. 
California also takes this approach of treating on-site and off-site 
conditions similarly. California’s common law imposes the broad 
disclosure duty under the general test31 that requires sellers to 
disclose to a buyer all material defects in the residential property 
actually known to the seller but unknown and unobservable to the 
buyer. While many cases have dealt with physical defects in the 
property being sold, only one California case has considered the 
 
the glass doors, and the stove in the kitchen.” Id. 
 28. 702 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Twenty-two residential home-
buyers sued the developer/seller for conspiracy, fraud, negligent supervision, negligent mis-
representation, breach of duty to disclose material facts, and violation of the Florida Land Sales 
Practices Act. Id. 
 29. Id. The trial court held that Johnson v. Davis did not impose a duty to disclose 
conditions that are off-site or open and obvious. Id. The trial court also specifically declined to 
follow Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995), because that case “involved an extreme 
set of facts involving a toxic landfill” and because Strawn was inconsistent with Florida law. 
Ribak, 702 So. 2d at 1317. 
 30. Ribak, 702 So. 2d at 1317 (citing Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 629). According to the 
Ribak court, a seller’s liability under Johnson is measured against whether the seller possessed 
knowledge of material facts affecting the value of the property that were not disclosed to an 
“unsuspecting buyer.” Id. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the developer/seller because the issue of materiality is one for the jury. 
Id. 
 31. See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1963). 
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common law duty to disclose an off-site condition. In Shapiro v. 
Sutherland, the court examined the off-site condition of 
neighborhood noise and applied both the common law and a 
statutory disclosure duty.32 The court utilized the same general test 
for this off-site condition as is used for on-site conditions and held 
that a seller should disclose a neighborhood noise problem if the 
noise “materially affects the value or desirability of the property.”33 
In other words, the court held that a seller is required to disclose an 
off-site condition if the elements of the general test are met.34 
Although not a suit by a buyer against a seller for failure to 
disclose an off-site condition, another California case stated that a 
seller would be required to disclose on the statutory disclosure form 
a neighbor’s noisy activity. In Alexander v. McKnight, the plaintiffs 
filed an action seeking equitable relief and damages due to their 
neighbors’ disagreeable behavior and violation of private 
restrictions.35 The disagreeable behavior included the use of a noisy 
tree chipper for a tree trimming business the neighbors operated out 
of their home, late-night basketball games, too many cars parked on 
their property, and motor oil poured on their roof.36 The plaintiff 
claimed that if and when he sold the property, he would need to 
disclose the noise problems, which would diminish the purchase 
price for his property.37 The court agreed, holding that if the 
conduct amounted to a nuisance and had a negative impact on the 
value of the property, the conduct would need to be disclosed by the 
plaintiff under California’s disclosure statute upon sale of the 
house.38 
 
 32. 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Ct. App. 1998); see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102–1102.17 (West 
2005). California’s disclosure form mandated by statute enumerates mostly on-site conditions, 
but also requires disclosure of neighborhood noise problems or “other nuisances.” Id. § 
1102.6. See infra text accompanying notes 129–43. 
 33. Shapiro, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 107. 
 34. The court specifically stated that sellers had a common law and statutory obligation 
to make a full disclosure as to these disturbances caused by the neighbors “if they in fact 
occurred and were of sufficient import as to materially affect the value or desirability of their 
property and/or amounted to a ‘neighborhood noise problem’ or a ‘nuisance’” Id. at 108. 
 35. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. The trial court in a bench trial awarded plaintiffs injunctive relief and damages of 
$28,000. Id. at 454. The defendants appealed only $24,000 of the monetary award. Id. 
 38. Id. at 454–55. However, the appellate court denied awarding “diminution in 
property value” damages in addition to injunctive relief as it would constitute unjust 
enrichment on the plaintiff’s part. Id. at 456. Assuming that the neighbors would obey the 
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Similarly, New Jersey’s common law disclosure duty did not 
initially depend on whether the defects were on- or off-site. In Tobin 
v. Paparone Construction Co., the builder/seller was found liable for 
failing to disclose an adjacent neighbor’s plans to build a tennis court 
and a high fence that would obstruct the buyer’s view.39 The court 
held that the builder/seller had a duty to disclose these plans since 
the buyer could not have discovered them.40 The court cited judicial 
trends in other jurisdictions to justify requiring higher accountability 
from builder/sellers based on the disparity of experience and the 
superior access a builder/seller has to information.41 The location of 
the defect did not appear to be a relevant factor in the court’s 
analysis. 
Twenty years later in Strawn v. Canuso, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court specifically considered whether sellers had a disclosure duty 
with respect to off-site conditions.42 In Strawn, the buyers of homes 
sued the developer and marketing brokers for failing to disclose the 
existence of a nearby hazardous waste dump.43 The trial court had 
rejected the need to disclose an off-site condition stating that “there 
is no duty that the owner of lands owe[s] to a prospective purchaser 
to disclose to that prospective purchaser the conditions of somebody 
else’s property.”44 The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed and 
held that a builder/developer of residential real estate or a broker 
can be liable for failing to disclose off-site physical defects. Liability 
attaches for failure to disclose those off-site physical conditions 
known to the developer or broker and “unknown and not readily 
observable by the buyer if the existence of those conditions is of 
sufficient materiality to affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of 
the property and, therefore, render the property substantially less 
desirable or valuable to the objectively reasonable buyer.”45 This is 
 
injunction to cease the noisy activity, the plaintiff would not suffer a decrease in property value 
when he eventually sold his house. Id. at 457. 
 39. 349 A.2d 574, 580 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). The tennis court came within 
one foot of plaintiff’s property line and was surrounded by a ten-foot high chain link fence. Id. 
at 575–76. 
 40. Id. at 577. 
 41. Id. at 578 (citing Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965)). 
 42. 657 A.2d 420, 423 (N.J. 1995). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 424. 
 45. Id. at 431. 
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the same test for disclosure of defects generally, so the court made 
no distinction between on-site and off-site conditions. 
The decision in Strawn was limited to professional 
builder/developers of real estate or brokers representing such 
projects and did not pertain to non-professional sellers of residential 
or commercial property.46 The court imposed the duty on 
professional sellers, developers, and brokers because of their superior 
bargaining power and their access to information, as well as the 
recent trends in other jurisdictions requiring a broker to investigate 
the property for material defects.47 The court exempted non-
professional sellers from this duty because such sellers are on equal 
footing with buyers.48 
Only five months after the decision in Strawn, the New Jersey 
legislature showed its disapproval of the case by passing a statute 
limiting the disclosure duty.49 Under the statute, a professional seller 
need only provide written notice to buyers of the existence of a list 
of certain off-site conditions and is not liable for failing to disclose 
off-site defects.50 
3. Rationales used by courts applying the general test to find no duty to 
disclose a condition that is off-site 
Most of the cases where the courts have used the same rule for 
off-site conditions as is used for on-site conditions have actually 
resulted in a determination that disclosure of the condition was not 
required. In other words, even within the parameters of the general 
disclosure rule requiring a seller to disclose all off-site conditions that 
are material, latent, and within the seller’s knowledge, the courts 
 
 46. Id. at 428. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 426 (citing Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965)). For 
criticism of the Strawn decision, see Robert Kwong, Fraud and the Duty To Disclose Off-Site 
Land Conditions: Actual Knowledge vs. Seller Status, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 897, 918–
23 (1997) (arguing that Strawn’s limitation to professional sellers was inconsistent with New 
Jersey’s case law, which applied the disclosure duty to all sellers). 
 49. See New Jersey New Residential Construction Off-Site Conditions Disclosure Act, 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3C-1 to -12 (West 2004). 
 50. A “seller’s responsibility to disclose those conditions that may materially affect the 
value of the residential real estate, but which are not part of the project, shall be fully met when 
notice is provided in accordance with the provision of [the act].” Id. § 46:3C-10(b) See infra 
notes 117–36 and accompanying text. 
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usually find that these criteria are not satisfied when the condition is 
off-site. 
 
a. Information available to buyer or defect is readily observable. 
Courts have frequently found that off-site conditions need not have 
been disclosed because information about such defects was equally 
available to both the buyer and the seller. For example, a Michigan 
court held that a seller of commercial land was not liable for failure 
to disclose state plans to construct a highway bypass which would 
divert traffic, and thus customers, away from the property.51 The 
court did not base its holding on the fact that the defect was off-site, 
but instead exonerated the seller because the construction plan was a 
patent condition which a reasonable investigation by the buyer 
would have revealed.52 
In a Massachusetts case, DiNunzio v. Jenkins, the sellers did not 
have to disclose the existence of a highway approximately 300–500 
feet off the property because it was a “readily observable, known 
physical condition” excluded from the seller’s disclosure duty.53 The 
court found that the highway was easily visible to the buyers during 
their many visits to the property,54 as was the noise level and its 
resulting effect on the property’s value.55 Again, the court analyzed 
this off-site condition in the same manner as on-site defects without 
explicitly distinguishing between the two and focused on the 
 
 51. McMullen v. Joldersma, 435 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
 52. Id. at 431. The court noted that the information was in the public records and that 
the buyers admitted taking note of a “rickety old bridge” presently there. Id. The court also 
held that a seller cannot be found liable for future possibilities; at the time of the sale, the 
bypass project was still contingent upon federal approval and funding, and therefore the sellers’ 
failure to disclose it did not constitute a fraudulent omission. Id. at 431–32. 
 53. No. 97-0706B, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 300, at *5 (July 21, 1999). In this case, 
the buyers sued the sellers’ real estate agent for violation of a state disclosure law that imposes 
liability when “any person” fails to disclose to a buyer any fact, the disclosure of which may 
have influenced the buyer not to enter into the transaction. Id. The court affirmed summary 
judgment for the agent because he did disclose the proximity of the highway in the disclosure 
form by describing the property as “near” the highway. Id. at *8. Even assuming that there 
was inadequate disclosure, the agent “did not have a duty to disclose because the proximity of 
I-495 to the property was a readily observable, known physical condition.” Id. at *5. It seems 
that in interpreting this statute, the court applied a test similar to the general disclosure duty 
test. 
 54. The buyers visited the property seven times over a four-month period. Id. at *2. The 
court also noted that cars passing on the nearby highway could be seen from the street in front 
of the property. Id. at *2. 
 55. Id. at *8. 
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obviousness of the condition as opposed to its location off the 
property. 
The court in Saslow v. Novick reached a similar conclusion, 
holding that a seller was not liable for failing to disclose an off-site 
defect that could have been discovered by the buyer.56 In that case, 
the city transit authority attempted to eliminate an adjacent subway 
station that provided substantial value to the business located on the 
purchased property.57 Even though the seller-defendants knew of the 
city’s plans, such information was a matter of public record and up to 
the diligent buyer to discover since the location of the subway was an 
essential issue to the transaction.58 
Neighborhood parking problems have similarly been found to 
constitute obvious defects. In Matthews v. Kincaid, the court found 
that the seller was under no duty to disclose the absence of off-site 
parking since it was an obvious, readily observable defect which the 
buyer was expected to discover through “ordinary inspection and 
inquiry” before purchasing the property.59  
 
b. Defect is not material. Sometimes courts have found that an 
off-site condition was simply not sufficiently material to give rise to a 
duty to disclose. In Sleasman v. Sherwood, the buyer discovered after 
his purchase that loud noises were coming from a nearby rock-
crushing operation.60 Finding for the defendants, the trial court, 
sitting without a jury, concluded that the noise level at the subject 
property prior to and at the time of the sale “was not loud or 
unusual and was not a material fact that should have been disclosed 
to the plaintiff.”61 The appellate court affirmed this holding.62 
 
 56. 191 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648–49 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
 57. Id. at 648. It was undisputed that the defendants knew of the attempt to remove the 
subway station, and that if the station was moved, the store would lose most of its value. Id. at 
647. 
 58. Id. at 649. 
 59. 746 P.2d 470, 472 (Alaska 1987).  
 60. 622 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App. Div. 1995). The buyer sought rescission of the 
transaction and alleged four causes of action: “(1) fraudulent misrepresentation that the 
property was fit for use as a summer recreational facility, (2) intentionally failing to disclose the 
existence of industrial noise . . . , (3) mutual mistake of fact due to the parties’ ignorance that 
the noise existed, and (4) negligent misrepresentation that the property was suitable for 
summer rentals.” Id. (numbering added). 
 61. Id. Apparently, the seller also had no knowledge at all about the defect. Id. This 
would have been an independent ground for precluding a duty to disclose. See infra Part 
II.A.3.c. 
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The court in Strawn v. Canuso also discussed the issue of 
materiality.63 The court stated that the issue of materiality typically 
would be a question for a jury,64 but held that some conditions—
namely “transient social conditions” in the community—are not 
material to a transaction as a matter of law, and in the absence of a 
specific inquiry, a seller has no duty to disclose them.65 Such 
conditions include, but are not limited to, “the changing nature of a 
neighborhood, the presence of a group home, or the existence of a 
school in decline.”66 The court did not elaborate on its standard for 
“transient social conditions,” perhaps leaving such determinations 
for courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. This standard is quite 
broad and elastic, as demonstrated by the subsequent cases 
attempting to apply it. For example, in Levine v. Kramer Group, the 
buyer argued that the defendant-professional sellers67 were liable for 
failing to disclose the complaints of a neighbor who was adjacent to 
the property upon which the buyer was building its home.68 The 
court agreed with the defendants that under Strawn, the neighbor’s 
complaints were not an off-site condition requiring disclosure 
because the complaints were unrelated to the subject property and 
the neighbor merely lived on a neighboring lot and expressed 
concerns about the new home being built.69 As such, the complaints 
fell under the category of transient social conditions, which there is 
no obligation to disclose.70 
 
 62. Id. at 362. 
 63. 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995). 
 64. See id. at 431. 
 65. Id. The court noted that Florida courts held a representation is “material” when the 
transaction would not have been entered into had the representation been made. Id. at n.4 
(citing Morris v. Ingraffia, 18 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1944)). The court also cited the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 538(2), which deems a matter “material” when “a reasonable man 
would attach importance to its existence” or “the maker of the representation knows or has 
reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in 
determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.” Id. 
 66. Strawn, 657 A.2d at 431. 
 67. The Strawn decision applied only to professional sellers and brokers. 
 68. 807 A.2d 264, 265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). The neighbor exhibited 
harassing behavior due to his unhappiness with the height of the buyer’s foundation, including 
writing disparaging letters to the mayor, the defendants, and the buyer. Id. at 265–66. 
 69. Id. at 269. 
 70. Id. The court also found that the condition was unknown to the seller, and 
therefore, even if it was material, there would be no duty to disclose it. Id.; see infra Part 
II.A.3.c. The New Jersey legislature later limited the court’s holding in Strawn by enacting the 
New Jersey New Residential Construction Off-Site Conditions Disclosure Act. N.J. STAT. 
ROBERYS.MRO.DOC 10/25/2006 3:11:11 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
968 
 
c. Seller lacks sufficient knowledge. A court might find that a seller 
was unaware of an off-site condition and thus cannot be found liable 
for failure to disclose it to a buyer. Although not specifically applying 
the general disclosure test, the court in Urman v. South Boston 
Savings Bank utilized this rationale when a seller failed to disclose 
that nearby property was polluted with toxic waste that potentially 
contaminated the groundwater near the purchased property.71 The 
buyer asserted a cause of action based upon a general consumer 
protection law72 pursuant to which the attorney general had adopted 
a regulation requiring disclosure much like the common law general 
disclosure rule. The regulation provides that a violation occurs if 
“any person . . . fails to disclose to a buyer . . . any fact, the 
disclosure of which may have influenced the buyer . . . not to enter 
into the transaction.”73 The court found the seller had no obligation 
to disclose due to the seller’s “limited state of knowledge.”74 The 
evidence established only that the seller-bank had been made aware 
of an undefined contamination problem that had affected a 
 
ANN. §§ 46:3C-1 to -12 (West 2004). See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text; infra 
notes 117–133 and accompanying text. 
 71. 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1080–81 (Mass. 1997). In August 1989, the Massachusetts 
Department of Environmental Protection had declared the area near the property a “priority” 
because of evidence that toxic materials were entering the nearby school from contaminated 
groundwater flowing under the school. Id. at 1080. The school was then closed for seven 
months for the purpose of cleanup. Id. Further investigation revealed that the subject property 
was located between the contamination source and the contaminated school. Id. The property 
itself was sold in December 1990. Id. 
 72. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (West 2005). On a related cause of 
action based on fraud, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s 
summary judgment for the seller because in Massachusetts, “[s]ilence does not constitute a 
basis for claiming fraud and misrepresentation, even where a seller may have knowledge of 
some weaknesses in the subject of the sale and fails to disclose it.” Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 
1081 (citation omitted). The buyer alleged that “[t]he previous owner had told the bank that 
he had difficulty selling the [property] because of a hazardous . . . waste problem at [a nearby] 
school.” Id. at 1080. Nevertheless, the bank did not inform the buyer that there had been a 
contamination problem in the vicinity, that the school had been closed, or that the previous 
owner found it difficult to sell the unit. Id. at 1080–81. 
 73. 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.16(2) (1994). The court acknowledged that in 
appropriate circumstances, where the seller is aware of material off-site physical conditions that 
are neither known to the buyer nor readily observable, there could be a duty to disclose 
pursuant to the consumer protection law. Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 1082. However, this case 
did not represent such appropriate circumstances. Id. 
 74. Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 1082. 
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neighborhood school.75 However, the problem had been remedied, 
and the school reopened prior to the plaintiff’s purchase of the 
property from the bank.76 As far as the bank knew, the 
contamination was not an ongoing problem; therefore, the bank had 
no duty to disclose it.77 
In Sleasman v. Sherwood, where the court held that noise from a 
nearby rock-crushing operation was not a material fact warranting 
disclosure by the sellers to plaintiff-buyers, the court noted, among 
other factors, the sellers’ claim that they were unaware of the 
condition.78 Similarly, in Levine v. Kramer Group, the court held that 
the sellers were under no duty to disclose harassing behavior by a 
neighbor,79 not only because the defect was immaterial as a transient 
social condition, but also because the sellers were not aware of any 
potential harm from the neighbor.80 
B. Judicial Approaches Specifically Applicable to Off-Site Conditions 
Some courts use tests for the duty to disclose defects that have 
the effect of treating off-site conditions differently than on-site 
conditions. Several approaches are worth noting. 
1. The off-site defect must affect the physical condition of the property 
Urman v. South Boston Savings Bank demonstrates that unless an 
off-site condition actually affects the subject property itself, it need 
not be disclosed.81 The buyers of a foreclosed condominium unit 
alleged that the seller failed to disclose to them a toxic waste 
contamination problem on a nearby property.82 The trial court held 
that, as a matter of law, the condition need not be disclosed because 
it was off-site.83 While the appeals court affirmed the summary 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. The court also rejected a third cause of action for a negligent infliction of 
emotional distress because the bank owed no duty to the buyer. Id. at 1083. 
 78. 622 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App. Div. 1995); see supra notes 70–73 and accompanying 
text. 
 79. 807 A.2d 264, 265–66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); see supra notes 68–70 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. Id. at 269.  
 81. 674 N.E.2d at 1082. 
 82. Id. at 1080. For a full discussion of the facts, see supra text accompanying note 72. 
 83. Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 1081–82. 
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judgment, it held that “the case [did] not turn exclusively on the fact 
that the alleged problem was off-site, although that [was] a factor to 
be considered.”84 Nevertheless, the appellate court agreed that 
disclosure was not warranted in this case.85 Not only did the seller 
lack sufficient knowledge, the court emphasized that the off-site 
defect never physically affected the property itself.86 Thus, this 
analysis suggests that a purely off-site environmental condition that 
does not physically affect the property would not need to be 
disclosed. 
2. The off-site condition exists on adjacent property owned by the seller 
An Iowa court imposed a duty on sellers to disclose an off-site 
condition when that condition exists on property owned by the seller 
that is adjacent to the property the buyer is purchasing. In Timm v. 
Clement, the seller sold part of his commercial property to buyers 
but did not disclose the existence of two underground storage 
tanks.87 The court found the seller liable for failing to disclose these 
tanks even if they were off-site.88 However, the court made it clear 
that it only imposed a duty on a seller to disclose off-site latent 
defects located on other property owned by the seller.89 The court 
specifically declined to extend its holding requiring disclosure to 
visible off-site conditions located on property owned by a party 
outside the contract.90 Thus, the court distinguished between the duty 
to disclose off-site conditions on property owned by the seller and 
 
 84. Id. at 1082. 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73; see also 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.16(2) 
(1994).  
 86. Urman, 674 N.E.2d at 1082. The court stated that “[i]n view of . . . the fact that 
the condition had not affected the condominium, and the absence of any demonstrable future 
danger to the condominium, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the bank is not liable . . . .” 
Id. 
 87. 574 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). There was a dispute as to whether the 
tanks were actually located on defendant’s or plaintiff’s property, but that fact was immaterial 
to the holding. Id. There was also evidence that the seller made affirmative misrepresentations. 
Id. at 372. At closing, it “signed a groundwater hazard statement stating that there were no 
underground storage tanks or hazardous waste on the [sold] property.” Id at 370. 
 88. Id. at 371–72. 
 89. Id. at 372. The court stated that “we do not go as far to impose a duty when the 
off-site conditions are visible and owned by a party outside the contract . . . .” Id. at 371–72. 
Moreover, the duty only exists when the off-site defect may materially affect the market value 
or desirability of the property to be sold. Id. at 372. 
 90. Id. 
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off-site conditions on property owned by a third party such as a 
neighbor. 
3. Seller’s knowledge that existence of off-site condition is important to 
buyer 
One New Jersey court limited a seller’s liability for failing to 
disclose an off-site condition to situations where the seller is aware 
that the existence or nonexistence of an off-site condition is 
important to a particular buyer. As described above, previously in 
New Jersey the disclosure duty was the same for on-site and off-site 
conditions.91 However, in the more recent case of Capano v. Borough 
of Stone Harbor, a federal court applying New Jersey law held that a 
seller was not liable for failing to disclose that there was no 
swimming access at a nearby beach.92 The court emphasized that the 
condition complained of was “external to both the property and the 
contract to purchase.”93 The court distinguished this case from Tobin 
noting that in the absence of direct communication by the buyer of a 
desire for a swimming beach, the seller “could not have known” 
whether “non-existence of [an off-site] swimming beach would 
render the property undesirable to the plaintiff.”94 
4. The location of the defect as a factor to be considered 
A Missouri court has taken an approach that gives weight to the 
fact that the condition is off-site, resulting in the court being less 
likely to find a disclosure duty for an off-site as opposed to an on-site 
condition.95 In Blain v. J.E. Jones Construction Co., buyers sued 
developers for failure to disclose their intent to build an apartment 
complex nearby.96 Even if the developers intended to build the 
nearby complex when they sold the homes to plaintiffs, and thus had 
knowledge superior to that of the buyers, the court agreed with the 
developers that they had no duty to disclose their intention to 
 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
 92. 530 F. Supp 1254, 1263 (D.N.J. 1982). The suit involved many complex issues, 
including estoppel, the Equal Protection Clause, and the public trust doctrine. Id. at 1257–58.  
 93. Id. at 1263. 
 94. Id. This case was also distinguished from Tobin since Tobin involved a misrepresen-
tation while no such claim was brought here. Id. 
 95.  Blain v. J.E. Jones Constr. Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).  
 96. Id. at 704. 
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build.97 The court considered a number of factors to determine 
whether a seller has a duty to disclose.98 The fact that the defect was 
off-site played a significant role in the decision. The court stated that 
“[i]n sales contracts, if the vendor conceals an intrinsic [on-site] 
defect not discoverable by reasonable care, there is a greater 
likelihood that a duty to disclose will be found than if the fact is 
something extrinsic [off-site] to the property likely to affect market 
value.”99 Moreover, the court stated that while a developer’s intent 
to build a nearby apartment complex could have an effect on a 
buyer’s decision to buy a house, “the significance of this fact is 
lessened by its extrinsic [off-site] nature.”100 
III. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO DISCLOSURE OF OFF-SITE 
CONDITIONS 
Legislatures in numerous states have imposed statutory duties 
requiring sellers to disclose the existence of defects when they sell 
their property. Various rules have been promulgated that are 
applicable to off-site conditions. 
A. Statutes Requiring Disclosure of Certain Off-Site Conditions 
Some states’ disclosure statutes contain broad catch-all provisions 
that could be interpreted as including off-site conditions. As an 
example, Iowa requires a seller to “[d]isclose all known conditions 
materially affecting this property.”101 Nebraska,102 Florida,103 
 
 97. Id. at 707–08. 
 98. Id. at 707. The court gave a non-exclusive list of factors considered in the 
jurisdiction, including “the relative intelligence of the parties to the transaction, the relation 
the parties bear to each other, the nature of the fact not disclosed, the nature of the contract, 
whether the concealer is a buyer or seller, the importance of the fact not disclosed,” and the 
parties’ “respective knowledge and means of acquiring knowledge.” Id. 
 99. Id. at 708. 
 100. Id. Additionally, the court held that there was no intelligence gap between the 
parties, no evidence of fiduciary or confidential relationship, the contract was at arm’s length, 
and the existence of multi-family zoning and a proposed layout of the multi-family buildings 
were part of the public record. Id. at 708–10. Thus, this information was accessible to the 
buyers. Id. at 708. 
 101. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 193E-14.1(543B) (2005). 
 102. Nebraska requires disclosure of “any defects that materially affect the value of the 
real property or improvements.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2, 120(4)(f) (2005).  
 103. Florida requires real estate brokers to “[d]isclos[e] all known facts that materially 
affect the value of residential real property and are not readily observable to the buyer.” FLA. 
STAT. § 475.278(2)(a)(4) (2005). 
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Virginia,104 Delaware,105 Oregon,106 Washington,107 and Louisiana108 
have similar broad provisions. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
prohibits any unconscionable commercial fraud, misrepresentation, 
or knowing concealment or omission of any material fact regarding 
the sale of any real estate.109 
Other statutory schemes require that sellers use disclosure forms 
that include broad language about specific types of conditions that 
could apply to off-site as well as on-site conditions. For example, 
Washington requires disclosure of “any study, survey project, or 
notice that would adversely affect the property.”110 Hawaii’s 
disclosure form requires disclosure of whether the property is in a 
“noise exposure area.”111 Oklahoma requires disclosure of the 
existence of “hazardous or regulated material and other conditions 
having an environmental impact.”112 Texas requires disclosure of 
“any lawsuits directly or indirectly affecting the [p]roperty.”113 
A different approach is taken by states whose statutory disclosure 
forms specifically include certain off-site conditions in a list of 
conditions that must be disclosed. For example, in California the 
legislature enacted a statutory disclosure law requiring a seller and 
 
 104. Virginia requires disclosure of “other material defects known to the owner.” VA. 
CODE ANN. § 55-519(A)(2)(viii) (2005). 
 105. Delaware provides that “a seller transferring residential real property shall disclose 
. . . all material defects of that property . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2572(a) (2005). 
 106. Oregon’s disclosure form asks, “[a]re there any other material defects affecting this 
property or its value that a prospective buyer should know about?” OR. REV. STAT. § 105.464 
(2005). 
 107. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.06.020 (2005). 
 108. Louisiana’s real property form requires disclosure of “other adverse materials or 
conditions.” Louisiana Residential Property Disclosure (2006), http://www.lrec.state.la.us/ 
forms/Residential Property Disclosure 2006 Legal.pdf. 
 109. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2005). The purpose of this statute has been 
interpreted as protecting the public from “sharp practices” in real estate that could victimize 
the buyer by inducing him or her to purchase through deceptive or fraudulent practices. 
Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 390 A.2d 566, 569 (N.J. 1978). 
 110. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.06.020. 
 111. HAW. REV. STAT. § 508D-15 (2005). The statute requires disclosure that the 
residential real property lies in a “noise exposure area” according to maps prepared by the 
department of transportation or within an Air Installation Compatibility Use Zone, officially 
designated by the military and found adjacent to military airports. Id. Therefore, information 
about neighboring properties is relevant.  
 112. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 833(B)(1)(g) (2005). Presumably, these conditions could be 
off-site. 
 113. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(b) (Vernon 2005). Such lawsuits could potentially 
involve other properties in the area. 
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any involved broker of a new or used residence to provide the buyer 
with a disclosure statement.114 This disclosure form enumerates 
mostly on-site conditions but also requires disclosure of 
“[n]eighborhood noise problems or other nuisances.”115 Tennessee’s 
disclosure form includes the duty to disclose “known neighborhood 
noise . . . or other nuisances” and whether there are “[a]ny 
authorized changes in road, drainage, or utilities [either] affecting . . 
. or contiguous to the property.”116 Michigan’s disclosure form 
requires disclosure of a “farm or farm operation in the vicinity; or 
[the] proximity to a landfill, airport, or shooting range, etc.”117 
Indiana requires the seller to disclose that “an airport is located 
within a [certain] geographic distance from the property.”118 
Delaware requires the seller to notify the buyer whether the “cost of 
repairing and repaving the streets adjacent to the property” is to be 
paid by the property owner, noting that “[r]epairing and repaving of 
the streets can be very costly.”119 Wisconsin’s disclosure form 
requires disclosure by a seller who is “aware of a defect caused by 
unsafe concentration of, unsafe conditions relating to, or the storage 
of, hazardous or toxic substances on neighboring properties.”120 
Georgia requires broker-sellers to disclose all material facts pertaining 
to existing adverse physical conditions of the property and “[a]ll 
material facts pertaining to existing adverse physical conditions in the 
immediate neighborhood within one mile of the property.”121 
 
 114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West 2005). 
 115. Id.; see also Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Ct. App. 1992); supra text 
accompanying notes 35–38.  
 116. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-210 (2005). 
 117. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.957 (West 2006). 
 118. IND. CODE § 32-21-5-7 (2005) (The Indiana real estate commission determines the 
appropriate geographic distance.). 
 119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2578 (2005). This specific requirement is in addition to 
the catch-all provision requiring that “a seller transferring residential real property shall disclose 
. . . all material defects of that property . . . .” Id. § 2572(a). 
 120. WIS. STAT. § 709.03 (2005). 
 121. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6A-5 (2005). Conditions requiring disclosure are those that 
are “actually known to the broker and which could not be discovered by the buyer upon a 
diligent inspection of the neighborhood or through the review of reasonably available 
governmental regulations, documents, records, maps and statistics.” Id. Enumerated examples 
include land-use maps and plans, zoning ordinances, recorded plats and surveys, transportation 
maps and plans, maps of flood plains, and tax maps. Id. The statute does not “create any duty 
[by] a broker to discover or seek to discover either adverse material facts pertaining to the 
physical condition of the property or existing adverse conditions in the immediate 
neighborhood.” Id.  
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Other jurisdictions delegate creation of the disclosure form to 
the state real estate commission.122 Some give the commission wide 
discretion as to what conditions require disclosure.123 Such 
delegation allows the state’s real estate commission to expand the 
disclosure duty by including off-site conditions in the disclosure 
form.124 
New Jersey takes a different legislative approach. Citing 
ambiguity in the disclosure duties of residential real estate sellers, the 
New Jersey legislature sought to define the seller’s disclosure duties 
and to create a public record of relevant off-site conditions that a 
buyer may access.125 The New Residential Construction Off-Site 
Conditions Disclosure Act, applicable only to professional sellers126 
and builders who sell newly constructed residential units,127 requires 
the municipal clerk to make available lists identifying the location of 
such off-site conditions within the municipality and any other 
municipality within one-half mile of the real estate.128 “Off-site 
conditions” are those that “may materially affect the value of 
residential real estate property”129 and are limited to nine 
enumerated conditions.130 A professional seller need only provide a 
 
 122. E.g., IOWA CODE § 558A.4 (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3198 (2005); MD. 
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(c)(2) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 833 (2005); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-50-40 (2005); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2578 (2005).  
 123. Kentucky requires that the disclosure form must include a list of on-site conditions 
and “[o]ther matters the commission deems appropriate.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360(3) 
(West 2005). Indiana provides discretion over “[o]ther areas that the Indiana real estate 
commission determines are appropriate.” IND. CODE § 32-21-5-7 (2005). 
 124. Leroy Gatlin II, Note, Reforming Residential Real Estate Transactions: An Analysis 
of Oklahoma’s Disclosure Statute, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 735, 754 (1997) (stating that 
“pursuant to its authority under the Act, the Oklahoma Real Estate Commission could make 
the disclosure form more effective by requiring the disclosure of known neighborhood 
nuisances”). 
 125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-2 (West 2005). 
 126. A professional seller is a real estate broker, salesperson, and broker-salesperson. Id. § 
45:15-3. 
 127. As defined in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-2.  
 128. See id. §§ 46:3C-4, -8.  
 129. Id. § 46:3C-3. 
 130. Id. The conditions are: (1) listings in the Department of Environmental Protection 
sites included on the National Priorities List; (2) sites known and confirmed by Department of 
Environmental Protection and included on New Jersey’s master list of known hazardous waste 
sites; (3) overhead electric utility transmission lines conducting 240,000 volts or more; (4) 
electric transformer stations; (5) underground gas transmission lines; (6) sewer pump stations 
of a capacity equal to or in excess of 0.5 million gallons per day and sewer trunk lines in excess 
of fifteen inches in diameter; (7) sanitary landfill facilities; (8) public wastewater treatment 
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written notice to the buyer of the existence of these lists at the time 
the contract is executed and is not required to compile or provide its 
own list or contribute to the municipality’s list.131 Upon delivery of 
the notice to the buyer, the seller is relieved of any further obligation 
and is not liable for failing to disclose actually known off-site 
conditions. 132 Thus, by statute, the broad common law disclosure 
duty for professional sellers set forth in Strawn v. Canuso133 was 
significantly limited.  
B. Statutes Appearing To Limit Disclosure to On-Site Conditions 
Several states limit a seller’s disclosure duties to physical defects 
within the boundaries of the property being sold. Such language 
seems to preclude the necessity of disclosing off-site conditions. For 
example, the Maryland statute calls for the residential property 
disclosure statement prepared by the seller to disclose items about 
the physical conditions in the property.134 Other states similarly limit 
disclosure to defects “on” or “within” the property.135 
 
facilities; and (9) airport safety zones. Id.  
 131. Id. § 46:3C-8. 
 132. Id. §§ 46:3C-8, -11. Section 46:3C-10(b) states that “[a] sellers responsibility to 
disclose those conditions that may materially affect the value of the residential real estate, but 
which are not part of the project, shall be fully met when notice is provided in accordance with 
the provisions of [the act].” Id. § 46:3C-10(b); see also Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 772 
A.2d 368, 376 (N.J. 2001) (“The legislative history demonstrates that the Disclosure Act was 
passed in order to overturn Strawn . . . .”).  
 133. 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995); see supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 134. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(d) (West 2006). The statute also 
enumerates on-site conditions that must be disclosed such as water and sewer systems, 
insulation, plumbing, hazardous material, and “any other material defects known to the 
vendor.” Id. § 10-702(e).  
 135. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3196 (2005) (defining “known defects” as 
conditions found “within the property”); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(D) (West 
2006) (limiting disclosure to “material matters relating to the physical condition of the 
property”). Tennessee’s legislation contains language relieving a seller from liability for failing 
to disclose any “act or occurrence which had no effect on the physical structure of the real 
property, its physical environment or the improvements located thereon.” TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 66-5-207 (2005). There seems to be contradictory language in another Tennessee statutory 
provision which requires disclosure of known neighborhood noise or other nuisances and 
whether there are any authorized changes in road, drainage, or utilities affecting the property 
or contiguous to the property. Id. § 66-5-210. 
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IV. CERTAIN PROBLEMATIC OFF-SITE CONDITIONS 
Two types of off-site conditions are worth noting separately: 
stigma defects and the presence of a sex offender. Although they 
could be analyzed under whatever applicable standard is used in the 
jurisdiction, they are problematic because they are somewhat 
different than other off-site conditions. 
A. Stigma Defects 
Certain properties might be considered defective because of non-
physical, psychological conditions or circumstances concerning the 
property’s history. These conditions include any condition that is 
psychological in nature. Among such conditions are circumstances 
involving the property’s history, such as a previous owner dying of 
AIDS or cancer, or a murder being committed on the property. 
Some courts and legislatures have dealt with the issue of whether a 
seller must disclose such stigma defects when they occur in the 
property being sold and have specifically excluded this type of on-site 
condition from a seller’s duty to disclose. 136 
Accordingly, to the extent that a seller would not be required to 
disclose stigma defects in the property itself, he would likewise not 
be required to disclose such conditions if they occurred off-site. In 
fact, Oregon’s legislature explicitly exempts sellers from disclosing 
that a neighboring property was “the site of a death by violent crime, 
by suicide or by any other manner” or was “the site of a crime, 
political activity, religious activity or any other act or occurrence that 
does not adversely affect the physical condition of or title to real 
property.”137 
Conversely, some jurisdictions do not exempt on-site stigma 
defects from disclosure. In Ohio, sellers are liable for non-disclosure 
of stigma defects if the buyer has made a specific inquiry. Van Camp 
v. Bradford, for example, involved stigma defects that were both on-
 
 136. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2156(2) (2006); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
689.25(b) (West 2005) (characterizing a previous murder, suicide, or death on the property as 
an immaterial fact that does not warrant disclosure); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.250 
(LexisNexis 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-50 (2005) (characterizing a previous occupant’s 
status as a sufferer of AIDS as a fact immaterial for purposes of disclosure). Similarly, Louisiana 
exempts a seller or an agent from liability for failing to disclose such conditions. LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 37:1468.  
 137. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 93.275 (West 2003). 
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site and off-site.138 The complaint alleged that defendant-seller knew 
that rapes occurred in the neighborhood and on the premises itself, 
yet failed to disclose this fact even after a specific inquiry by the 
buyer.139 Even though at the time Ohio still applied the doctrine of 
caveat emptor with regard to real estate sales,140 the court created an 
exception and held that misrepresentation, concealment, or non-
disclosure of a latent material fact by a seller of a residential property, 
when a specific inquiry is made, is evidence for a breach of duty by 
the seller.141 The court stated that claims for “psychologically tainted 
property [are] the natural culmination of the trend regarding 
property disclosure in Ohio, and [would] be upheld by th[e] 
court.”142 The court also held that the stigma defect at issue was a 
latent property defect that was not readily discoverable.143 Such a 
defect could become material if a buyer communicates the 
importance of the subject to the seller.144 In its holding, the court 
did not make any distinctions between on-site and off-site stigma 
defects.145 
While this case was limited in its application because it only dealt 
with non-disclosure where there was a specific inquiry by the 
buyer,146 it opens the door to including off-site stigma defects in a 
duty to disclose. 
B. Presence of a Sex Offender 
Little case law exists on whether a common law disclosure duty 
extends to the off-site condition of the presence of a sex offender in 
 
 138. 63 Ohio Misc. 2d 245, 249–50 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1993). 
 139. Id. A second cause of action in this case alleged affirmative misrepresentation by the 
seller who was asked by the buyer about the purpose and necessity of bars on the windows. Id. 
The seller replied that while a break-in occurred sixteen years earlier, the residence was 
currently safe. Id.  
 140. Id. at 252. Ohio enacted a disclosure statute, but it was not in effect at the time of 
this sale. Id. 
 141. Id. at 254. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 253. (“Checking police records in order to ascertain the relative safety of a 
neighborhood or a particular residence would not be an action undertaken by even the most 
prudent of purchasers.”). 
 144. See id. at 255. The misrepresentation is material “regardless of its significance to a 
reasonable person under similar circumstances.” Id. 
 145. See id. at 254–55. 
 146. See id. at 250. 
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the neighborhood.147 So far, New York is the only jurisdiction to 
address the factual issue, but did so in the context of a limited 
disclosure duty. In Glazer v. LoPreste, the court refused to require a 
seller to disclose that a registered sex offender lived across the 
street.148 This case, however, does not necessarily indicate how this 
type of defect would be considered in a jurisdiction that uses the 
general disclosure test. At the time Glazer was decided, New York 
law did not impose a duty to disclose defects on sellers, except if the 
seller or his agent was either in a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
with the buyer, or if he actively concealed information.149 The court 
refused to require disclosure of the presence of the sex offender 
because, on the facts of the case, there was no such relationship or 
active concealment, and the information was readily discoverable 
because local newspapers had published many articles about the 
neighbor’s record as a sex offender.150 Furthermore, the buyer made 
no effort to discover information about the neighborhood, and the 
seller and broker did not try to prevent the buyer from conducting 
his own investigation.151 
Some statutory disclosure duties pertain to the duty to disclose 
the presence of sex offenders in the neighborhood. While Montana 
requires brokers, but not regular sellers, with actual knowledge of 
registered sexual or violent offenders relevant to the transaction to 
disclose such information,152 other states completely shield both 
sellers and brokers from liability because such information is 
 
 147. There are no cases dealing directly with whether the presence of a sexual predator in 
the neighborhood should be considered a material defect. See Flavio L. Komuves, Comment, 
For Sale: Two-Bedroom Home with Spacious Kitchen, Walk-In Closet, and Pervert Next Door, 27 
SETON HALL L. REV. 668, 698 (1997); Lori A. Polonchak, Comment, Surprise! You Just 
Moved Next to a Sexual Predator: The Duty of Residential Sellers and Real Estate Brokers To 
Disclose the Presence of Sexual Predators to Prospective Purchasers, 102 DICK. L. REV. 169, 194 
(1997). 
 148. 717 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (App. Div. 2000). In March, 2002, a statutory disclosure 
duty became effective in New York. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 461 (McKinney 2002). It 
requires a seller to complete and sign a property condition disclosure statement to be delivered 
to a buyer or buyer’s agent prior to the signing by the buyer of a binding contract of sale. Id. § 
462. The disclosure form enumerates only on-site conditions. See id.  
 149. Glazer, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 257. 
 150. Id. at 258. 
 151. Id. But see Komuves, supra note 147, at 700 (“Real estate experts seem to indicate 
that the presence of a sex offender in a neighborhood, just as any other off-site defect, will 
decrease the fair market value of a home. Accordingly, courts will probably recognize the 
presence of a sex offender as a material fact.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 152. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-105 (2005). 
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immaterial to the transaction. For example, North Carolina deems 
the presence of a sex offender an immaterial condition and does not 
require disclosure, even though “no seller may knowingly make a 
false statement regarding any such fact.”153 Similarly, South Carolina 
provides that “[a]n owner is not required to disclose the fact or 
suspicion that a property may be or is psychologically affected,” 
including “public information from the sex offender registry.”154 
Likewise, Arizona’s disclosure statute exempts sellers from disclosing 
the proximity of a sex offender.155 
Other jurisdictions require only that the seller disclose to the 
buyer where to get information about registered sex offenders, 
thereby turning such information into a patent condition a buyer is 
expected to discover. For example, California requires disclosure of 
the existence of the state sex offender registry,156 but shields both 
sellers and brokers from a duty to provide any additional 
 
 153. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 39-50 (West 2005). 
 154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-50-90(a) (2005). 
 155. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2156 (2006). Some commentators have argued 
that shield statutes that protect sellers from disclosing the close proximity of a sex offender 
have created an apparent conflict with the goal of protecting the public by making available 
lists of neighborhood sex offenders as evidenced by Megan’s law. See generally Shelley Ross 
Saxer, “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?”: Requiring Landowner Disclosure of the Presence of Sex 
Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 NEB. L. REV. 522, 560–61 (2001); Tracey A. Van 
Wickler, Legislative Review, H.B. 2564: The Real Estate Disclosure Act Threatens Arizona’s 
Children with Becoming “Megan” Victims, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 367 (2000). As an example of this 
conflict, North Carolina shields sellers from liability for failing to disclose that a sex offender 
resides in or near the property, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 39-50, while the legislature provides 
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 that sex offenders pose significant threats to the community, 
which justifies release of personal information about such offenders to law enforcement 
agencies. 
 156. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.10a(a) (West 2006). Most states have enacted some type of 
registration requirement for released sex offenders. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-22 (2005) (“The 
responsible agency shall require the adult criminal sex offender to declare, in writing . . . the 
actual address at which he or she will reside or live upon release . . . .”); see GA. CODE ANN. § 
42-9-44.1 (2005) (requiring the sex offender to give notice of his or her name, address, crime 
convicted of, and date of parole to the superintendent of the public school district where he or 
she will reside and to the county sheriff); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821; ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 12-12-901 (West 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 2006); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (2005); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 944.606 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8301 to -8328 (2005); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 22-4902 to -4912 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.510 (West 2005); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540–:544 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.721–.732 (West 2006); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-21 to -57 (West 
2005).  
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information.157 Michigan,158 Connecticut,159 Alaska,160 Minnesota,161 
and Washington162 similarly require disclosure of only the existence 
of public information regarding sex offenders. 
V. OFF-SITE CONDITIONS SHOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM 
DISCLOSURE 
As noted above, courts and legislatures use varied rules to 
determine which off-site conditions a seller must disclose to a buyer. 
This Article suggests a very simple approach: the seller
163 should not 
be responsible for disclosing any off-site conditions to the buyer. The 
disclosure duties imposed on sellers in recent years should apply only 
to conditions on the real property being sold, and should not be 
extended to conditions existing beyond the property lines. The 
 
 157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.10a(b). The California statute provides that the following 
language must be included in every lease agreement and contract for sale of residential real 
property: “Notice: The California Department of Justice, sheriff’s departments, police 
departments . . . maintain for public access a database of the locations of [registered sex 
offenders]. The database is updated on a quarterly basis and is a source of information about 
the presence of these individuals in any neighborhood.” Id. § 2079.10a(a)(1).  
 158. Michigan’s disclosure form provides, “[b]uyers are advised that certain information 
compiled pursuant to the Sex Offenders Registration Act . . . is available to the public. Buyers 
seeking that information should contact the appropriate local law enforcement agency or 
sheriff’s department directly.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.957 (typeface altered from 
original). 
 159. Connecticut limits its disclosure requirement by requiring only that the disclosure 
form include “[a] statement that information concerning the residence address of a person 
convicted of a crime may be available from law enforcement agencies or the Department of 
Public Safety and that the Department of Public Safety maintains a site on the Internet listing 
information about the residence address of persons required to register [as sex offenders], who 
have so registered.” CONN. GEN STAT. § 20-327b(d)(2)(G) (2004). 
 160. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.050(1)–(2) (2006).  
 161. Minnesota requires a broker to disclose that information on registered sex offenders 
may be maintained and by whom and if the broker has actual knowledge of sexual or violent 
offender registration information that pertains to the subject property. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
82.22. 
 162. Washington’s disclosure form includes a notice to the buyer that law enforcement 
has information on registered sex offenders. The notice is “not an indication of the presence of 
registered sex offenders.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.06.020 (West 2005) (typeface altered 
from original). 
 163.  The policies and the proposed rule discussed in this section of the Article are meant 
to apply specifically to non-professional sellers of real property. Although cases and statutes 
discussing professional sellers and brokers were set forth in previous sections to illustrate 
approaches taken by courts and legislatures, this Article does not consider whether additional 
duties of disclosure should be placed on brokers or professional sellers. 
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advantages of this proposed rule lie in its certainty, ease of admini-
stration, and fairness. 
This proposed rule that the seller should not be required to 
disclose off-site conditions will be referred to as the “property line 
rule.” For purposes of analysis, it will be compared to the “general 
test” discussed earlier, namely, that a seller must disclose defects that 
are latent, known to the seller, and materially affect the value of the 
property, even if the defect is off-site.164 
A. Policy Considerations Favoring the Property Line Rule 
1. Certainty 
A benefit of the property line rule is that it is a “certain” or 
“bright-line” rule. It provides a clear and unambiguous result with 
respect to off-site conditions. If the alleged defect is an on-site 
condition, it will have to be disclosed if the requirements for 
disclosure under the general test are met. However, if the alleged 
defect is not within the property line, it need not be disclosed. Rules 
that are certain are advantageous to the parties and the legal system 
for several reasons. 
 
a. Predictability. (1) Advantages. One major benefit of rules that 
are certain is that their clarity results in predictability. People will 
know in advance what the law expects of them and can model their 
behavior in accordance with the rule. The courts’ affinity for rules 
that are certain can be seen in cases involving many different areas of 
the law. For example, in Benvenuto v. Mahajan, the court adopted a 
bright-line rule on an issue involving attorney’s fees, stating that one 
of the benefits of such a rule is that it gave “clear guidance” to the 
parties.165 Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Lowe’s Home Centers, 
Inc., the court opted for a strict application of the “economic loss” 
rule for lost profits because the strict rule provides the advantages of 
“certainty of a bright-line rule” and “predictability to courts and 
parties alike.”166 Thus, “[o]bjective standards and bright-line rules    . 
 
 164. See supra Part II.A. 
 165. 715 A.2d 743, 745 (Conn. 1998). 
 166. 608 S.E.2d 636, 639 (Ga. 2005). The plaintiff sought to recover tort damages after 
hazardous material was discovered on property it contracted to acquire in order to expand its 
existing store. Id. at 637. The “economic loss rule” generally provides that a contracting party 
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. . are the very keys to predictability” because “everyone knows or 
can discover the rules in advance of their application.”167 Various 
other courts have opted for bright-line rules in a diverse range of 
matters including attorney negligence in drafting a will,168 worker 
compensation benefits,169 right to counsel,170 choice of law,171 and 
U.C.C. Article 9.172 
 
 (2) Application to disclosure duty. The property line rule 
advocated by this Article would bring the advantage of predictability 
of bright-line rules to this area of the law that is presently very 
 
can recover in tort only those economic losses resulting from damages to property it already 
owns. Id. 
 167. Lai v. Sagle, 818 A.2d 237, 248 (Md. 2003) (quoting DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins 
Hosp., 677 A.2d 73, 76 (Md. 1996)). The court in this case had to decide whether the 
plaintiff’s lawyer’s statement to the jury that the defendant had been previously sued warranted 
a mistrial. Id. at 239. Because such evidence was inadmissible, the court opted for a bright-line 
rule that a mistrial was necessary. Id. at 248–49. The court noted that “[t]he advantage of a 
bright line rule lies in its certainty and uniformity in application.” Id. at 248. 
 168. In Beauchamp v. Kemmeter, the court refused to expand a general rule providing 
that attorneys are not liable to third parties for negligent acts committed within the scope of an 
attorney-client relationship unless the attorney “acts negligently in drafting or supervising the 
execution of a will resulting in a loss to a beneficiary named therein.” 625 N.W.2d 297, 299 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Auric v. Cont’l Gas Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983)). 
The court emphasized that this bright-line rule “facilitates predictability in estate planning.” 
Id. at 301. 
 169. In Ametek, Inc. v. O’Connor, the court imposed a bright-line rule that any credit for 
payment that an employer made prior to an increase in a workers’ compensation award should 
be calculated on a weekly basis. 771 A.2d 1072, 1081 (Md. 2001). The court emphasized the 
advantage of predictability in that area of law. See id.  
 170. The issue in McCambridge v. State was when the “critical stage” in the criminal 
process begins and the right to counsel attaches. 778 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 
The court established a bright-line rule that a critical stage in criminal proceedings does not 
occur until formal charges are brought against a suspect. Id. at 75–76. In support of its bright-
line rule, the court noted that “the creation of [this] bright line rule results in predictability.” 
Id. at 76. 
 171. E.g., McMillan v. McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662 (Va. 1979). The Virginia Supreme 
Court maintained its bright-line rule that in tort cases, where there is a conflict of law, the law 
of the situs of the tort governs. Id. at 664. The court chose not to abandon the benefits of 
uniformity, predictability, and ease of application of the Virginia rule “in exchange for a 
concept which is so susceptible to inconstancy . . . .” Id. 
 172. McFarland v. Brier, 850 A.2d 965 (R.I. 2004). The main issue in this case was 
whether a certificate of deposit constituted an “instrument” under Article 9 of the U.C.C., 
notwithstanding the fact that it bore a “nontransferable” legend. Id. at 975–76. The court 
applied a bright-line rule in holding that certificates of deposit constitute “instruments” for 
Article 9 purposes: “Predictability, clarity, and certainty are the key benchmarks in this area of 
the law . . . .” Id. at 977 n.7. 
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uncertain. With the property line rule, a seller would know that he 
need not worry about disclosing defects beyond the property line. A 
buyer would know that he could not rely on the seller to tell him 
about anything outside of the property boundaries. The parties could 
structure their transaction in light of this rule. 
The general test has the opposite effect. A seller does not know 
what off-site conditions he needs to disclose, which exposes the seller 
to a great deal of uncertainty. For example, assume that the 
neighborhood children often play basketball in a neighbor’s yard. 
The thump of the basketball and the noise of the children can clearly 
be heard from the seller’s property. The seller would not know 
whether this is something he must disclose. To some people the 
sound of children playing is a nuisance. To others, it is music to their 
ears. Under the general rule, a court might find it to be a material 
condition affecting the value of the property. To be on the safe side, 
the seller would need to disclose it. However, it might never cross a 
seller’s mind that this might be considered a defect. Suppose this 
condition exists a block away, but the noise can still be heard. The 
seller would face the same dilemma. Under the general test, the 
seller must consider all of the conditions existing in the area from 
noise problems to parking issues to prospective development, and 
make a determination of whether they are close enough and 
significant enough to require disclosure. The law provides little 
guidance to sellers, while at the same time exposing them to 
potential liability. 
 
 b. Judicial economy. (1) Advantages. It is an important policy of 
the law to discourage litigation.173 Rules that are certain provide clear 
outcomes and thereby effectuate a policy of efficient judicial 
administration. Parties are less likely to litigate when they know what 
the outcome will be. Furthermore, if litigation is brought, the 
certainty of the outcome will lead to quicker settlement or resolution 
by the court at the pretrial stage. Thus, among the virtues of a 
certain rule are less expense, faster resolution of disputes, and judicial 
economy. 
In many situations, clear rules have been adopted because their 
certainty will reduce litigation. For example, in applying a bright-line 
rule in interpreting coverage of an insurance policy indemnification 
 
 173. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846 (Ct. App. 1976).  
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provision, the California Supreme Court explained that “by 
increasing certainty and decreasing uncertainty about the duty to 
indemnify, [the rule] serves to deter some litigation on the issue and 
to conclude what it does not deter expeditiously and soundly.”174 
The policy of using bright-line rules to reduce litigation is also 
evident in an Illinois case in which the court refused to displace its 
rule that prevents children under the age of seven from being found 
contributorily negligent in accidents.175 The court retained its strict 
age-limit rule in order to enhance predictability and judicial 
economy, emphasizing that a bright-line rule “relieves the jury of the 
burden of determining what standard of care” to apply in a particular 
case.176 
In the real property arena, additional examples can be found in 
the law of easements, where many courts have chosen to adopt the 
rule that the owner of a servient estate cannot substantially alter or 
relocate an easement without the consent of the owner of the 
dominant estate.177 Among the benefits cited by the court of this rule 
is that it closes the door to increased litigation over “reasonableness” 
issues.178 Likewise, when establishing a rule for restrictive covenants, 
a court adopted a standard of strict interpretation in order “to 
reduce litigation by increasing certainty.”179 
 
 (2) Application to Disclosure Duty. To illustrate the judicial 
economy of the property line rule, assume that after a sale, a buyer 
 
 174. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court, 16 P.3d 94, 107 
(Cal. 2001). 
 175. Chu v. Bowers, 656 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). The plaintiff in this case, 
a six-year-old girl, was riding her bicycle when the defendant’s car struck her. The defendant 
asserted the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. The plaintiff moved to strike this 
defense because under the tender-years doctrine in Illinois, a child under seven years of age 
cannot be contributorily negligent. Id. at 437–38. 
 176. Id. at 439. The court so held, despite recognizing that several other jurisdictions 
have rejected the doctrine primarily because of the arbitrariness of any age limit. Id. 
 177. See, e.g., Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1231 (Colo. 
2001). 
 178. See Herren v. Pettengill, 538 S.E.2d 735, 736 (Ga. 2000). 
 179. Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Or. 1997). The court reasoned that a 
maxim of strict construction of restrictive covenants when ambiguity exists prevents imposing a 
restriction that a buyer is not reasonably expected to know, allows full use of property, reduces 
litigation, and enhances uniform interpretation of similar covenants. Id. Other examples 
abound. See, e.g., State v. Hartley, 511 A.2d 80, 88 (N.J. 1986) (noting that a bright-line 
interpretation of the requirement for a suspect to be given fresh Miranda warnings before 
resumption of custodial interrogation will help avoid “confusion and conflict in future cases”). 
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learns that the owners of property several blocks away are planning 
to build a discount store. The store will generate traffic, some of 
which will pass by the buyer’s property, thereby detracting from the 
quiet nature of the neighborhood. Does the disappointed buyer have 
a cause of action against his seller for failure to disclose this off-site 
condition? Under the property line rule the answer is clearly in the 
negative. Nothing needs to be litigated. If the buyer does bring a 
lawsuit, any claims for nondisclosure can be summarily rejected at 
the pretrial stage of litigation. 
In contrast, the general test is quite uncertain and can result in 
much litigation. For example, on the facts of the hypothetical set 
forth above, the buyer does have a cause of action under the general 
test. Whether the buyer’s lawsuit will be successful will depend on 
numerous factors that will need to be litigated. Among these are 
whether the fact that a store will be built is material,180 whether it 
was readily observable,181 whether the information was equally 
available to the buyer,182 or whether the seller knew about it.183 
Furthermore, these relevant factors of the general test are all 
questions of fact that, when present, prevent disposal of the case at 
the pretrial stage of litigation, such as by a demurrer, a motion to 
dismiss, or a motion for summary judgment.184 These factual 
inquiries of the general rule usually compel a full trial, resulting in 
increased litigation expense and utilization of judicial resources. 
The case of Sleasman v. Sherwood demonstrates the expensive 
litigation resulting from the application of the general test to off-site 
conditions.185 Even though the defendant-sellers won, they endured 
a lengthy trial where they had to call numerous witnesses.186 Only 
 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 60–62. 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 53–59. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52. 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 71–80.  
 184. Roberts, supra note 5, at 20. Summary judgment is granted only when no triable 
issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437(c) (West 2006). Accordingly, in reversing a 
summary judgment in favor of a seller and requiring the case to go to trial, the court in Ribak 
v. Centex Real Estate Corp. stated “[i]f the evidence raises any issues of material fact, if it is 
conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the issues, it 
should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by the jury.” 702 So. 2d 
1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 185. 622 N.Y.S.2d 360 (App. Div. 1995). 
 186. Defendants not only had to testify themselves that they never heard any industrial 
noise, they also had to call six witnesses, including former renters of the cabins, to testify that 
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after an appeal did the sellers determinatively prevail on the issue that 
the defect was not material and thus did not need to be disclosed.187 
Similarly, in Matthews v. Kincaid, the defendant-seller was 
exonerated of liability only after the case reached the Alaska Supreme 
Court, which reversed the trial court’s finding and held that lack of 
off-site parking was readily observable to the buyer.188  
 
 c. Costs of real estate transactions. The unpredictability of the 
general test may result in increased costs of real estate sales. The 
more risk of litigation imposed on sellers as a result of their sale, the 
greater the likelihood that sellers will respond by raising the price of 
the property. Under the general test, a seller runs the risk that after 
the sale he might be sued for failure to disclose an off-site condition. 
He is likely, therefore, to compensate for this risk by increasing the 
price. The property line rule, on the other hand, eliminates one of 
the risks of litigation faced by a seller after he sells his property and 
may result in lower transaction costs. 
2. Fairness 
Of course, certainty, predictability, and judicial economy should 
not be the only determinants in deciding which rule to apply. If 
these were the only considerations, all legal rules would be bright-
line rules involving no discretion by a finder of fact. Often, flexible 
rules are called for in order to reach fair results. In deciding whether 
to use a certain rule such as the property line rule or a flexible rule 
such as the general test, the relevant question becomes whether the 
benefits of flexibility warrant the increased uncertainty and 
expense.189 
 
they heard no industrial noise prior to the closing. Id. at 361. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 746 P.2d 470, 472 (Alaska 1987). The plaintiff had prevailed at the trial court level 
and was awarded $98,258.20 in damages. Id. at 471. 
 189. For example, in deciding an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the United States 
Supreme Court valued the need for certainty and simplicity over individualized justice in each 
particular case. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 465 n.13 (1980). See also 
Christina L. Wu, Comment, Noncompete Agreements in California: Should California Courts 
Uphold Choice of Law Provisions Specifying Another State’s Law?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 593 
(2003), where the author argues for California to adopt a bright-line rule upholding choice of 
law provisions in out-of-state non-compete agreements. The author emphasizes that while a 
bright-line rule is less “sensitive” to factual distinctions, “it would nevertheless satisfy the 
ultimate goal of producing fair and consistent outcomes.” Id. at 596. Also, in McMillan v. 
ROBERYS.MRO.DOC 10/25/2006 3:11:11 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
988 
 
 a. The benefits of a flexible rule do not warrant the cost. There are 
few benefits to the flexibility provided by the general test for 
disclosure of off-site conditions. Even under the general test, 
situations where a court would conclude at the end of litigation that 
the seller should have disclosed an off-site condition are very rare. In 
fact, no currently viable case has actually found a seller liable for 
failure to disclose an off-site condition.190 The general test requires 
that the off-site condition materially affect the subject property, 
would not be discovered by the buyer, is known to the seller, and is 
material.191 It is difficult to imagine a purely off-site condition a seller 
would know about that the buyer could not reasonably find that 
would materially affect the subject property. For example, cases 
applying the general rule have concluded that a nearby industrial 
rock-crushing plant,192 the unavailability of off-street parking,193 and 
plans to build a highway bypass194 were all reasonably discoverable 
and thus did not require disclosure.195 Location of toxic waste sites 
and registered sex offenders residing in the community are generally 
 
McMillan, the Virginia Supreme Court chose to retain a bright-line rule for choice of law in 
torts cases, stating it did not wish to abandon the benefits of the uniformity, predictability, and 
ease of application of the Virginia rule in exchange for a concept “which is so susceptible to 
inconstancy.” 253 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Va. 1979). 
 190. Two cases held that liability should be imposed if the conditions were material. The 
court in Shapiro v. Sutherland reversed a summary judgment in favor of the seller and 
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of materiality, holding that the seller 
would be liable for the failure to disclose neighborhood noise if the noise was material. 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 101, 111 (Ct. App. 1998). Similarly, the court in Ribak v. Centex Real Estate Corp. 
reversed a summary judgment and remanded the case for a jury determination of the issue of 
whether failing to disclose that “a water treatment plant” was also a “wastewater treatment 
plant” was material. 702 So. 2d 1316, 1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). As mentioned above, 
there were two cases in New Jersey where professional sellers were found liable for failing to 
disclose off-site conditions. See Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995); Tobin v. 
Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d 574 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). These cases, however, 
are not good law since they were superseded by a statute under which professional sellers are 
only required to notify buyers that a list of certain off-site conditions within the municipality 
exists. See New Jersey New Residential Construction Off-Site Conditions Disclosure Act, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-10(b) (West 2004). For more information, see supra notes 39–50 and 
accompanying text. 
 191. See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (Ct. App. 1963); supra Part II.A.1. 
 192. Sleasman v. Sherwood, 622 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App. Div. 1995). 
 193. Matthews, 746 P.2d at 471. 
 194. McMullen v. Joldersma, 435 N.W.2d 428, 430–31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
 195. See supra Part II.A.3.a. But see Ribak, 702 So.2d at 1316. (appearing not to require 
inspection by the buyer to discover an adjacent wastewater plant). 
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available in public records. Landfills are usually surrounded by fences 
with marked signs, and other nearby conditions could be discovered 
by simply driving through the neighborhood. These cases illustrate 
that defects that are off-site and are significant enough to be material 
are usually not latent. Since buyers can discover them with 
reasonable diligence, the defects would not need to be disclosed 
even under the general test. 
Of course, situations requiring disclosure under the general test 
could arise under particular fact patterns. For example, a seller might 
know of something that is going to happen in the neighborhood 
that is not yet a matter of public record, such as the seller learning of 
a neighbor’s intention to develop his property in a manner that 
would adversely affect the seller’s property before the neighbor has 
applied for a building permit or publicly disclosed his plans. Another 
example would be unusual conditions that a buyer would not suspect 
or be expected to discover, such as a neighbor who repeatedly makes 
loud noises in the middle of the night. However, precedent shows 
that courts are reluctant to grant relief to a buyer even in these types 
of situations. An argument could be made that the neighbor’s plans 
to develop his property need not be disclosed because the zoning 
laws allowing for such future development are equally discoverable 
by the buyer.196 The neighbor who makes noises in the night could 
be labeled a “transient social condition” that need not be 
disclosed.197 
As set forth above, the costs of applying the general test to off-
site conditions are high. Because there are so few cases where a 
flexible rule such as the general test is needed to protect a buyer, the 
costs of applying the general test are not warranted. 
 
b. The property line rule affords protection to sellers. Considerations 
of fairness do not only involve the interests of buyers; the situation of 
sellers must also be given weight. The general test requires a seller to 
disclose any latent, material, off-site condition that is known to the 
seller. However, under this test, the seller is uncertain at the time of 
 
 196. See McMullen, 435 N.W.2d at 430–31 (finding that plans for the construction of a 
highway bypass were discoverable by the buyer). 
 197. See Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 431 (N.J. 1995). The New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that in the absence of a specific inquiry, there is no obligation to disclose a 
“transient social condition” such as “the changing nature of a neighborhood, the presence of a 
group home, or the existence of a school in decline.” Id. 
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sale whether an off-site condition is one that he must disclose. This 
uncertainty is compounded because there are no limits in the general 
test regarding the proximity of the defect to the property being sold. 
The seller may be required to disclose anything a buyer might 
discover and later allege is material. What is material to one buyer 
may not be material to another. As discussed earlier, even under the 
best scenario, sellers will be burdened by lengthy and costly 
litigation.198 In contrast, this uncertainty will be eliminated under the 
property line rule. This rule will eliminate the risk to the seller of 
facing litigation over off-site conditions and will put buyers on notice 
that they are responsible for investigating the neighborhood to 
satisfy themselves. 
3. Off-site conditions are distinguishable from on-site conditions. 
This Article is not advocating the abolition of the general test 
with regard to the disclosure of on-site conditions, even though a 
rule of “no duty to disclose” would of course promote the goals of 
predictability and judicial economy. Considerations of fairness that 
are the basis of the general test with respect to on-site conditions do 
not apply with equal force to off-site conditions. With on-site 
conditions, the rationale for requiring disclosure is that a seller who 
has lived on the property is thought to have knowledge about the 
condition of the property superior to that of a buyer.199 Therefore, it 
is reasonable to impose a duty on sellers to disclose latent, material 
defects about which they are aware.200 This rationale is substantially 
diminished when the conditions are off-site. There should be no 
expectation that by simply living in a neighborhood, a seller would 
know about off-site conditions such as contamination of a nearby 
property201 or an attempt by a city transit authority to eliminate a 
subway station.202 Moreover, off-site conditions are not hidden 
behind a lock and key and can often be easily discovered by 
prospective buyers. 
Furthermore, if an off-site condition turns into an on-site 
condition, it will be subject to the general test and not the property 
 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 180-183. 
 199. Roberts, supra note 5, at 12. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Urman v. S. Boston Sav. Bank, 674 N.E.2d 1078 (Mass. 1997).  
 202. See Saslow v. Novick, 191 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1959).  
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line rule. This comports with considerations of fairness, because then 
the seller would be more likely to have superior knowledge of the 
condition. An example of a condition that originates off-site and 
then becomes on-site is something that ultimately physically intrudes 
upon the subject property, such as a nearby toxic waste spill that 
eventually leaks onto the seller’s property.203 
B. Judicial and Statutory Approaches Support the Property Line Rule 
1. Disclosure cases and statutes 
Several judicial and statutory approaches to a seller’s duty to 
disclose defects support the property line rule. For example, the 
approach of limiting disclosure obligations to off-site defects that 
affect the physical condition of the property is tantamount to saying 
that the defect must be on-site. This approach was employed in 
Urman v. South Boston Savings Bank, where the court did not 
impose liability on a seller for failure to disclose a toxic 
contamination in a nearby property and emphasized that the off-site 
defect never physically affected the property itself.204 Several states 
have enacted statutes that impose this limitation. For example, in 
Ohio, the residential property disclosure law requires disclosure of 
defects limited to “material matters relating to the physical condition 
of the property.”205 Tennessee’s legislation relieves a seller from 
liability for failing to disclose any “act or occurrence, which had no 
effect on the physical structure of the real property, its physical 
environment or the improvements located thereon.”206 
Another approach supporting the property line rule is the 
limitation on disclosure of off-site defects to those that exist on 
adjacent property owned by the seller. Not only does this approach 
show judicial concern for the location of defects, but it also follows 
the rationale that it is a seller’s superior knowledge of the conditions 
on the property that triggers a disclosure duty. The Iowa Court of 
Appeals used this test in Timm v. Clement, where it stated that 
 
 203. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 204. 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (Mass. 1997); see supra notes 72-77. 
 205. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(d) (West 2006); see supra note 135.  
 206. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-207 (2005); see supra note 116; see also MD. CODE 
ANN., REAL. PROP. § 10-702(d) (West 2003); MINN. STAT. § 513.55 (2003) (requiring only 
disclosure of “all material facts pertaining to adverse physical conditions in the property”). 
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disclosure was required because the latent off-site defects were 
located on property also owned by the seller.207 
2. Non-disclosure cases: Environmental stigma cases 
Courts have used a property line rule in analyzing claims 
unrelated to disclosure duties. These cases involve claims by 
landowners for devaluation of their property due to environmental 
contamination that is not on their property but rather on other 
property in the neighborhood. In other words, the contamination is 
an off-site condition. Many courts have held that these 
“environmental stigma” damages are unrecoverable because the 
contamination did not physically intrude on the plaintiff’s 
property.208 For example, in Adams v. Star Enterprise, a major 
discharge of oil occurred at the defendant’s facility with a “plume” of 
oil extending underground toward the plaintiffs’ town.209 Although 
the plaintiff-homeowners’ properties were not physically affected, 
they sued for diminution in property value due to the proximity of 
the plume.210 The court affirmed dismissal of the diminution of value 
claim because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate actual physical 
encroachment on their properties.211 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The demise of the doctrine of caveat emptor and the imposition 
of a duty on sellers to disclose defects in property being sold left 
unresolved the issue of whether sellers should be obligated to 
disclose off-site conditions as well. Extending a seller’s disclosure 
duty to off-site conditions ignores the inherent differences between 
on-site and off-site conditions. With off-site conditions, a disclosure 
duty is not justified by a seller’s superior knowledge or a buyer’s lack 
of opportunity to inspect. Moreover, applying the general disclosure 
 
 207. 574 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); see supra text accompanying notes 
87–90.  
 208. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2003). 
 209. 51 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 425; see also Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992) 
(holding that landowners must still show that contamination physically intruded on their land 
where negative publicity creates fear of potential future contamination). 
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duty test to off-site conditions will result in uncertainty, costly waste 
of judicial resources, and unfairness to sellers. 
Adopting instead the property line rule that requires no 
disclosure of off-site conditions will promote fairness and stability in 
real estate transactions. Sellers will not have to fear the prospect of 
lengthy litigation and potential liability for failure to disclose an off-
site condition arising after the sale. Buyers will necessarily pay more 
attention themselves to the surrounding neighborhood before 
purchase knowing that a judicial remedy is unavailable. 
The costs of requiring disclosure of off-site conditions are too 
high to warrant the problems associated with such a rule. 
Accordingly, in the absence of misrepresentation, courts should 
adopt the rule that a seller is not liable for failure to disclose off-site 
conditions. A certain and bright-line rule for a seller’s duty to 
disclose defects should be drawn at the property line. 
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